Showing posts with label Climate Change GHGs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Climate Change GHGs. Show all posts

Sunday, January 25, 2026

Accounting for Ocean Impacts Nearly Doubles the Social Cost of Carbon

This article argues that traditional measures of the social cost of carbon (SCC) have largely overlooked the impacts of climate change on "blue capital," which includes marine ecosystems and infrastructure. The authors integrated the latest ocean science and economic data into a climate-economy model to capture the repercussions for corals, mangroves, seaports, fisheries, and mariculture. This integrated approach estimates the welfare effects of these ocean-based damages on a global scale. By conceptualizing an "ocean-based SCC" or "blue SCC," the study identifies a massive component of climate damage currently missing from standard global indicators. The research emphasizes that the ocean is vital to a thriving society, supporting both market economies and non-market values like coastal protection.

The study finds that the inclusion of marine capital impacts leads to a dramatic increase in the estimated cost of carbon emissions. It highlights that blue capital is especially critical to low-income countries, where it represents a larger share of the national GDP compared to wealthier nations. Changes in ocean chemistry and physical conditions, driven by anthropogenic emissions, are directly threatening these essential resources. The model suggests that without accounting for these ocean-related impacts, policymakers are making decisions based on incomplete and significantly underestimated damage functions. This work advocates for a comprehensive "blue economy" framework that reflects the true interdependence of the environment and the global economy.

The 2020 blue SCC is estimated at US$48 per tCO2, which represents an almost doubling of the SCC estimate from the same model when ocean impacts are excluded. Under a lower discount rate of 2%, this blue SCC value increases significantly to US$168. The study also notes that the elasticity of substitution between blue capital components is the most influential parameter in these calculations. Furthermore, different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) result in varying temperature increases by 2100, such as 3.58 °C under SSP2 and up to 4.18 °C under SSP3. These figures illustrate the profound financial implications of failing to protect marine ecosystems.

Bastien-Olvera, Bernardo A., Octavio Aburto-Oropeza, Luke M. Brander, William W. L. Cheung, Johannes Emmerling, Francesco Granella, Massimo Tavoni, Jasper Verschuur, and Katharine Ricke. "Accounting for Ocean Impacts Nearly Doubles the Social Cost of Carbon." *Nature Climate Change* (January 2026). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-025-02533-5

Trends and Biases in the Social Cost of Carbon

Richard Tol provides an updated meta-analysis of the social cost of carbon (SCC), a central statistic used to justify climate policies by measuring the benefit of reducing CO2 emissions. The study explores how various ethical assumptions and model parameters, such as the pure rate of time preference, influence the final estimates. Tol notes that the literature is dominated by a relatively small, concentrated network of authors from a few specific countries. This concentration may introduce publication and citation biases that have historically pushed SCC estimates upward. The paper aims to refine the meta-database to provide a more accurate characterization of uncertainty in these economic projections.

The meta-analysis confirms that while SCC estimates have trended upward over time, they are characterized by a large and right-skewed uncertainty. This "thick tail" in the distribution means there is a non-negligible possibility of extremely high costs. Interestingly, the study finds that the social cost is much higher when climate change is assumed to affect economic growth rates rather than just the levels of output and welfare. Tol argues that while the total impact of a 2.5 °C warming is a factor, it is less influential than the underlying ethical views and discount rates chosen by researchers. The findings suggest a need for more diverse perspectives in the production of these influential climate-economy figures.

The central estimate of the social cost of carbon identified in this updated meta-analysis is approximately $200–250 per ton of carbon. When converted to carbon dioxide, this range equates to $700–900 per tCO2. The study specifically looks at the economic impact of a 2.5 °C warming as a benchmark for comparison. Furthermore, Tol examines the influence of citation networks, noting that the field's focus on a "small network of authors" can lead to biases that have pushed the social cost up beyond what a broader literature might suggest. These values provide a stark contrast to the lower estimates often used in older government policy assessments.

Tol, Richard S. J. "Trends and Biases in the Social Cost of Carbon." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* (2025). https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.15340

Hidden Costs of Repealing EPA's Carbon Pollution Standards

This issue brief analyzes the 2025 proposal by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to repeal the Carbon Pollution Standards (CPS) for fossil-fired power plants. The authors evaluate the economic and environmental consequences of this deregulatory move, particularly in the context of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). The stated goals of the repeal are to lower costs and meet rising electricity demand, but the brief argues these benefits may be illusory. Using the Haiku simulation model, the researchers updated demand projections to reflect the latest economic data. The study aims to reveal the "hidden costs" that an official cost-benefit analysis might overlook, such as unabated greenhouse gas emissions.

The findings suggest that the proposed repeal would actually fail a traditional cost-benefit test even before factoring in climate damages. This is largely due to updated electricity demand forecasts and changes in tax credits under the OBBBA. Repealing the standards is expected to slow the reduction of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and lead to a resurgence in coal-fired power generation. The authors argue that the deregulatory agenda does not align with the economic realities of the modern power sector. Consequently, the repeal could lead to higher overall costs for society and households despite the administration's stated objectives.

The numeric analysis indicates that repealing the CPS would lead to an increase in coal generation of 169–456 TWh by 2040. This represents a generation level 4.8 to 8.7 times higher than would occur with the standards in place. The brief was published in August 2025 following the EPA's June proposal. The study utilized updated data to show that the repeal fails a traditional cost-benefit test when considering the integration of the OBBBA and new demand forecasts. These statistics highlight the significant shift in the U.S. energy trajectory that the repeal would trigger.

Roy, Nicholas, and Karen Palmer. "Hidden Costs of Repealing EPA's Carbon Pollution Standards: Consequences for the Environment, Households, and Society." *Resources for the Future Issue Brief 25-10* (August 6, 2025). https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/hidden-costs-of-repealing-epas-carbon-pollution-standards-consequences-for-the-environment-households-and-society/

Wednesday, June 14, 2023

Life Cycle Air Pollution, Greenhouse Gas, and Traffic Externality Benefits and Costs of Electrifying Uber and Lyft

Abstract 
Transportation network companies (TNCs), such as Uber and Lyft, have pledged to fully electrify their ridesourcing vehicle fleets by 2030 in the United States. In this paper, Aniruddh Mohan, Matthew Bruchon, Jeremy Michalek, and Parth Vaishnav introduce AgentX, a novel agent-based model built in Julia for simulating ridesourcing services with high geospatial and temporal resolution.  The authors then instantiate this model to estimate the life cycle air pollution, greenhouse gas, and traffic externality benefits and costs of serving rides based on Chicago TNC trip data from 2019 to 2022 with fully electric vehicles. They estimate that electrification reduces life cycle greenhouse gas emissions by 40–45% (9–10¢ per trip) but increases life cycle externalities from criteria air pollutants by 6–11% (1–2¢ per trip) on average across our simulations, which represent demand patterns on weekdays and weekends across seasons during prepandemic, pandemic, and post-vaccination periods. A novel finding of their work, enabled by their high resolution simulation, is that electrification may increase deadheading for TNCs due to additional travel to and from charging stations. This extra vehicle travel increases estimated congestion, crash risk, and noise externalities by 2–3% (2–3¢ per trip). Overall, electrification reduces net external costs to society by 3–11% (5–24¢ per trip), depending on the assumed social cost of carbon.
by Aniruddh Mohan, Matthew Bruchon, Jeremy Michalek, and Parth Vaishnav 
Environmental Science & Technology https://pubs.acs.org/journal/esthag via ACS https://pubs.acs.org
Volume 57, Issue 23, pages 8524–8535; Publication Date: June 1, 2023

Tuesday, May 23, 2023

New damage curves and multimodel analysis suggest lower optimal temperature

Abstract:
Economic analyses of global climate change have been criticized for their poor representation of climate change damages. Here we develop and apply aggregate damage functions in three economic Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) with different degrees of complexity. The damage functions encompass a wide but still incomplete set of climate change impacts based on physical impact models. [The authors] show that with medium estimates for damage functions, global damages are in the range of 10% to 12% of GDP by 2100 in a baseline scenario with 3 °C temperature change, and about 2% in a well-below 2 °C scenario. These damages are much higher than previous estimates in benefit-cost studies, resulting in optimal temperatures below 2 °C with central estimates of damages and discount rates. Moreover, [they] find a benefit-cost ratio of 1.5 to 3.9, even without considering damages that could not be accounted for, such as biodiversity losses, health and tipping points.
Fig. 1: Overview of the creation and use of the damage functions.

Fig. 2: End-of-century damages for the five macro-regions for two scenarios.


by Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst, Francesco Bosello, Shouro Dasgupta, Laurent Drouet, Johannes Emmerling, Andries Hof, Marian Leimbach, Ramiro Parrado, Franziska Piontek, Gabriele Standardi & Detlef van Vuuren 
Nature Climate Change https://www.nature.com Volume 13, Pages 434–441 (2023)

Sunday, May 21, 2023

Policies, Projections, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 Model

Abstract
The present study examines the assumptions, modeling structure, and preliminary results of DICE-2023, the revised Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (DICE), updated to 2023. The revision contains major changes in the carbon and climate modules, the treatment of non-industrial greenhouse gases, discount rates, as well as updates on all the major components. The major changes are a significantly lower level of temperature of the cost-benefit optimal policy, a lower cost of reaching the 2° C target, an analysis of the impact of the Paris Accord, and a major increase in the estimated social cost of carbon.
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Table 7 and Figure 7 show estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC). The SCC in the baseline run is $61/tCO2 for the 2020 period (in 2019 international $). This is above the SCC for the C/B (Cost/Benefit) optimal run of $53/tCO2 because damages are smaller in the C/B optimum. It is far below the SCC for the 2 °C run of $85/tCO2. The higher SCC in the temperature-limited run reflects the economic interpretation that a tight temperature limit is equivalent to a damage function with a sharp kink at the temperature limit and therefore to a sharply higher damage function above 2 °C. Note that the estimates of the SCC in the current DICE version are significantly above those in earlier vintages for reasons discussed in other sections, see particularly the next section. 

One of the most instructive findings involves the importance of discounting for the SCC and other policies. Table 7 shows the powerful impact of discounting on the SCC. The social cost of carbon at a 5% discount rate is two-thirds of the DICE C/B optimal estimate for 2020, while that of a 1% discount rate is 8 times the DICE C/B optimal estimate for 2020.
Additionally, Figure 8 compares estimates of the SCC with several other current values. The GIVE model is a comprehensive estimate prepared by researchers at Resources for the Future using probabilistic estimates of output and other components of damage estimates (Rennert et al., 2022). It uses a relatively low discount rate and has a relatively high social cost of carbon. A second set of estimates pertains to the SCC used by the federal government and prepared by an interagency working group. Figure 8 shows draft SCC estimates from EPA (2022) for both their overall assessment and specific to a damage module based on the DSCIM model (Climate Impacts Lab, 2022) for near-term discount rates from 1.5% to 2.5%. Conditional on discounting assumptions, the EPA estimates align very closely with those of DICE-2023. Figure 8 also shows a draft update (OMB, 2021) based on earlier methods and models which did not contain recommended methodological updates. This estimate is notably lower than the corresponding value in DICE-2023. The key takeaway from Figure 8 is the importance of the discount rate in determining the SCC.

A major change in the results of the DICE model over the years has been the rising estimates of the social cost of carbon. The original DICE-1992 model did not calculate a SCC, which came later to climate-change economics. However, rerunning the baseline scenario for the 1992 model gives an estimate of $18/tCO2 compared to $61/tCO2 in the 2023 model (in 2019$). The upward revision is a notable illustration of the evolving scientific understanding of damages, discount rates, and levels of output. Further research will provide a decomposition of the sources of the change in SCC due to different components.

by Lint Barrage & William D. Nordhaus
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) www.NBER.org
Working Paper 31112; Issue Date: April, 2023

Wednesday, May 10, 2023

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Would Lower Pennsylvania Emissions, Add to State Revenues, and Have Little to No Impact on Electricity Rates

A new report analyzes the expected impact on Pennsylvania emissions, power generation, revenue, and jobs, offering six central conclusions.  

In 2022, despite fierce opposition, Pennsylvania joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade program designed to reduce carbon emissions from Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic power plants. Ongoing lawsuits have so far prevented the program from going into effect. But what impact would RGGI have on Pennsylvania if the program passes muster?

Researchers at the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy at the University of Pennsylvania and Resources for the Future (RFF) joined forces to find out.  A new report released by the two institutions analyzes the expected impact on Pennsylvania emissions, power generation, revenue, and jobs, offering six central conclusions:  

Joining RGGI reduces Pennsylvania’s electricity sector emissions to 84 percent below 2020 levels in 2030. Without RGGI, the state’s electricity sector emissions would be 52-49 percent below 2020 levels in 2030.

Combined Economic Effects in Pennsylvania


Emissions reductions are achieved with small or negative changes in retail electricity prices. Low allowance prices translate into a small increase (1 percent) in Pennsylvania’s retail electricity prices in 2030 under an annual 3-percent declining emissions cap. When the cap declines to zero by 2040, retail prices see a small decrease (-0.6 percent).  

Joining RGGI decreases coal generation and increases renewable generation in Pennsylvania. Joining RGGI causes coal generation and—to a lesser extent—gas generation to fall in Pennsylvania. Wind and solar capacity and generation increase. 

Joining RGGI decreases Pennsylvania exports slightly, but the state remains a major regional electricity exporter across all scenarios. The increase in renewable generation is not as large as the decrease in fossil generation, leading to a reduction in exports.  

Pennsylvania gains substantial revenue from joining RGGI. While allowance prices are low in 2030 if Pennsylvania joins RGGI, the state still gains $101 to $148 million from the auction of emissions allowances in that year—much of it from allowances sold to generators in other states.

Joining RGGI is unlikely to impact overall employment in the state. Pennsylvania would have the opportunity to use some of the program revenue to benefit communities impacted by the phaseout of coal. 

The team used RFF’s Haiku electricity model to see what would happen if Pennsylvania joined—or did not join—RGGI under two emissions scenarios: one in which RGGI’s emissions “cap” falls 3 percent per year, and one in which the RGGI cap falls at 3 percent per year through 2026 and to zero in 2040.  

Thursday, January 14, 2021

The New Economics of Electrifying Buildings - An Analysis of Seven Cities - All-Electric New Homes: A Win for the Climate and the Economy

As states and cities across the United States work to cut carbon emissions from every sector, they’re starting to tackle a crucial transition: eliminating fossil fuels in buildings. Burning fossil fuels, primarily gas, to heat space and water and cook food poses a risk to climate goals and public health. Thus, spurring the shift to modern, electric appliances like heat pumps becomes critical.
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Buildings are quickly becoming a cornerstone of ambitious climate policy, as policymakers recognize they can’t achieve the necessary science-based emissions reductions without tackling this stubborn sector. This means states and cities across the country won’t meet their climate goals if new buildings in their jurisdiction include fossil fuel systems that lock in carbon emissions over the 50 to 100-year building lifetime.

The cost of such an ambitious transition is often the first consideration. Thus, to help inform these crucial decisions, Rocky Mountain Institute updated and expanded their 2018 analysis, The Economics of Electrifying Buildings. They examined the economics and carbon emissions impacts of electrifying residential space and water heating, now with seven new cities and additional methodology changes. Today, we are releasing the first set of our findings examining newly constructed single-family homes. In every city we analyzed, a new all-electric, single-family home is less expensive than a new mixed-fuel home that relies on gas for cooking, space heating, and water heating. Net present cost savings over the 15-year period of study are as high as $6,800 in New York City, where the all-electric home also results in 81 percent lower carbon emissions over the mixed-fuel home.
Key Findings
The new all-electric, single-family home has a lower net present cost than the new mixed-fuel home in every city we studied: Austin, TX; Boston, MA; Columbus, OH; Denver, CO; Minneapolis, MN; New York City, NY; and Seattle, WA.
  • In most cities, the mixed-fuel home (with gas furnace, water heater, air conditioning, and new gas connection costs) has a higher up-front cost than the all-electric home, which uses a heat pump system for both heating and cooling. This is true in Austin, Boston, Columbus, Denver, New York, and Seattle. The Minneapolis climate requires a higher capacity heat pump than other cities in the study. This comes at a higher cost, outweighing the equipment and labor cost savings seen with heat pump systems in milder climates.
  • There are significant energy savings with the heat pump space and water heater over corresponding gas appliances, resulting in a lower annual utility cost for the all-electric home in most cities—up to 9 percent lower in Minneapolis. The two modeled scenarios have nearly equivalent utility bills in Boston and Seattle.
  • The all-electric home results in substantial carbon emissions savings over the mixed-fuel home in all cities. The greatest savings are found in Seattle (93 percent) and New York City (81 percent). Minneapolis, Columbus, Boston, and Austin all save more than 50 percent over the lifetime of the equipment compared with the mixed-fuel home.
Context and Methodology
Cities in California, Washington, New York, and Massachusetts have all passed laws or adopted codes mandating or encouraging all-electric new building construction. Regional coalitions across the country are forming to extend lessons learned from these first movers to other states, including in New England and the Midwest.

Thus, we extended our Economics of Electrifying Buildings research to assess the economic case for electrification in a variety of climate zones. Several of these states are actively considering new policies or incentives to spur the transition to all-electric buildings.

In partnership with Group 14, we have updated our methodology from the 2018 report to be more readily replicable in support of building decarbonization policy decisions across the United States, incorporating the following:
  • A thorough energy use calibration for each scenario to end-use breakdown, energy use intensity, and gas/electricity fuel split with the latest available Energy Information Administration Residential Energy 
  • Consumption Survey data by climate region
  • A 15-year greenhouse gas emissions comparison that incorporates data from both the US EPA and NREL’s Regional Energy Deployment System model to project changes in carbon intensity for electricity consumed in each state through 2036
  • RSMeans construction costing factors to account for location-specific variability in up-front cost
  • Building industry performance standards from ASHRAE for HVAC systems, EnergyStar for household appliances, and WaterSense for potable water fixtures
Policy Implications
Our analysis shows that all-electric new construction is more economical to build than a home with gas appliances, regardless of location. Given these findings, policymakers should embrace policies that incentivize or mandate all-electric residential new construction. In addition, they should prioritize complementary policies that address several obstacles that are impeding widespread adoption of all-electric homes. We suggest the following actions:
  • Educate contractors. Our research finds that there is low contractor comfort with heat pump systems for year-round heating in cities with severe winter climates, a notion that persists from an era of older technology. Today, there are cold-climate heat pumps designed to address concerns of low capacity and efficiency in cold temperatures, best practice design guidelines, and case studies proving the efficacy of cold-climate heat pumps.To promote contractor readiness as all-electric building codes come online, policymakers and regulatory agencies should establish contractor trainings on heat pump technologies (see for example, NYSERDA’s Clean Energy Workforce Development program and San Jose’s Educational Program). For high rates of participation, ensure attendees have a reason to attend. Some jurisdictions have considered paying participants for their time. Others have allowed trained participants to be added to a qualified contractors list.
  • Educate consumers and developers. Consumers and developers are increasingly knowledgeable about modern, efficient heating and cooking technology like heat pumps and induction stoves. But their comfort with the technologies must be fostered to realize the unprecedented market expansion that is needed in the next 10 years to align the buildings sector with our global climate goals.Policymakers and regulatory agencies should establish education campaigns for residents and building developers about the health, economic, and climate benefits of all-electric homes. Familiarizing consumers with induction cooking is a particularly important issue with a variety of novel solutions (see for example, San Jose’s Induction Cooktop Checkout Program).
  • Update gas line extension allowances. Typically, gas utilities offer an allowance to compensate a portion of the cost of a new customer gas service extension, with the remainder paid by the customer or developer of the new property. Our research finds that the allowance is highly variable: it could be as low as $1,000 or higher than $5,000, in some states covering the total cost to connect the gas pipeline to a new home. Gas utility customers bear the cost of this allowance over time, therefore socializing the cost of unnecessary, uneconomic infrastructure that is not aligned with air quality, health, or climate goals. Regulatory agencies should reassess these allowances as a part of their transition planning and management of stranded asset risk.
  • Address the split incentive challenge through creative financing. In Boston and Seattle, the all-electric home has a lower cost to build, but a slightly higher cost to operate. To ensure that all consumers benefit from the up-front cost savings for all-electric homes, home mortgages could be amortized in a manner to reduce the monthly payments to compensate for higher bills. Additionally, utility regulators and policymakers should work to make the cost of gas reflect the societal cost of greenhouse gas emissions or health impacts. This can be done through a greenhouse gas emissions tax, an air quality/health impacts adder, or an increase in permitting costs for extraction and transport of fossil fuel.
This is the first release of in the new Economics of Electrifying Buildings series. Later this year, we will release findings for single-family retrofits. In early 2021, we plan to provide a detailed technoeconomic analysis for multifamily buildings, examining the case for all-electric new construction and retrofits in all seven cities.

Austin: Single-Family Homes
RMI analyzed the costs of a new all-electric home versus a new mixed-fuel home that relies on gas for cooking, space heating, and water heating. In Austin, the all-electric home saves $4,400 in net present costs and 15 tons of CO2 emissions over a 15-year period.










Key Findings
The new all-electric home has a lower net present cost than the new mixed-fuel home, presenting savings on both up-front costs and utility bills.
• A mixed fuel home (with gas furnace, water heater, air conditioning, and new gas connection costs) has a higher up-front cost than the all-electric home, which uses the heat pump system for both heating and cooling.
The all-electric home has 7% lower annual utility costs. There are significant energy savings with a heat pump space and water heater over corresponding gas appliances, even though electricity is significantly more expensive than gas per unit energy in Austin.
Carbon emissions from heating, water heating, and cooking are 65% lower over the appliance lifetime in the all-electric home, due to more efficient appliances and increasingly low-carbon electricity.













































Boston: Single Family Home
RMI analyzed the costs of a new all-electric home versus a new mixed-fuel home that relies on gas for cooking, space heating, and water heating. In Boston, the all-electric home saves nearly $1,600 in costs and 51 tons of CO2 emissions over a 15-year period.










Tuesday, January 12, 2021

The Benefits and Costs of Decarbonizing Costa Rica's Economy

Costa Rica's National Decarbonization Plan (NDP) sets the ambitious goal for the country to become carbon-neutral by 2050 and lays out a wide range of policy and institutional reforms to achieve this goal. The authors of this report developed an integrated model that estimates the benefits and costs of implementing the NDP in all major sectors, informed by consultations with numerous government agencies, industries, and nongovernmental organizations, and used it to evaluate whether the NDP makes economic sense for Costa Rica — that is, whether the benefits of the NDP exceed its costs.

The authors' analysis suggests that under the vast majority of plausible assumptions about the future, the NDP would achieve or nearly achieve its greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals and do so at a net economic benefit. Conversely, without a concerted focus and investment in decarbonization, Costa Rica's greenhouse gas emissions will increase substantially.







































The findings from this study can play an important role in ensuring that the implementation of the NDP is robust — meaning that it will achieve its goals in the uncertain future. This analysis confirms which lines of action are most critical to the success of the NDP — transport and land use — and identifies some key conditions necessary to achieve close to zero net emissions at a large net economic benefit. This study also offers ideas and models that are valuable for other countries interested in decarbonization, and that can inspire development partners globally.

Key Findings
  • Under baseline assumptions, decarbonization would yield $41 billion in net benefits to Costa Rica between 2020 and 2050, using a 5 percent discount rate.
  • Under all but 22 of the more than 3,000 plausible futures considered, implementation of the decarbonization plan would lead to economic benefits that exceed the costs.
  • Currently, electricity is almost completely renewable, and with modest investments it would provide nearly emissions-free energy to support the electrification of much of Costa Rica's economy.
  • In the transport sector, significant emissions reductions are possible through electrification of transport and shifting to public transportation. The economic benefits from energy savings, fewer accidents, time saved from reduced congestion, and the reduced negative impacts of air pollution on health more than compensate for the initially higher up-front costs of switching to electric vehicles and building infrastructure for zero-emissions public transport.
  • Reducing emissions in agriculture and livestock could lead to increased productivity, and increasing carbon sequestration by forests would increase valuable ecosystem services, such as renewable forestry products, water and soil benefits, and support for tourism and cultural heritage.
  • Emissions reductions from buildings, industry, and the waste sector are also important to reach zero net emissions and together provide modest net benefits through energy cost savings, increased productivity, and the value of treating and recycling and reusing liquid and solid waste.

Recommendations
  • Costa Rica should continue implementing its NDP to both meet its international obligations to decarbonize and facilitate an economic transition that would very likely lead to large net benefits and contribute to a sustainable COVID-19 pandemic recovery.
  • As Costa Rica recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, it should focus on decarbonization investments that would reactivate the economy and provide support to the most critically affected sectors of the economy.
  • Costa Rica should monitor the costs of alternative-fuel vehicles, as well as the adoption of improved public transportation options, and make adjustments to the transport decarbonization strategies as needed to ensure net economic benefits and sufficient emissions reductions.
  • As Costa Rica continues to manage its forests for long-term sustainability, it should measure and monitor ecosystem service benefits in order to best target the NDP interventions.
  • Costa Rica should continue to develop more-detailed proposals for implementing the plan and reevaluate benefits and costs periodically to ensure the greatest net benefits, including by aligning its Nationally Determined Contribution to the NDP.
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Our analysis suggests that, under baseline assumptions, implementing the NDP would lead to net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 and provide about $41 billion of net benefits across the economy from 2020 to 2050, discounted back to 2015 at a rate of 5 percent per year.3 It would save or otherwise provide $78 billion in benefits, and it would cost about $37 billion. There is significant uncertainty around these estimates, but the analysis shows that under the vast majority of plausible assumptions about the future, the NDP would achieve or nearly achieve its emissions reduction goals and do so at a net economic benefit.

Under baseline assumptions, fully implementing all lines of action in the NDP would lead to about $41 billion in net benefits (Figure S.2). The greatest benefits are due to actions affecting transport,  agriculture, livestock, and forestry net emissions. In the agriculture, livestock, and forestry sectors, ecosystem services provided by forests, such as renewable forestry products, water and soil benefits, support for tourism and cultural heritage, and improved yields are worth much more than the investments required to decarbonize and the forgone value of land dedicated to forests—providing discounted net benefits of about $22 billion. The public and private transport sectors together with the freight sector would provide $19 billion in net benefits under baseline assumptions, since the economic benefits from energy savings, fewer accidents, time saved from reduced congestion, and the reduced negative impacts of air pollution on health more than compensate for the initially higher up-front costs of switching to electric vehicles and building infrastructure for public transport (Godínez-Zamora et al., 2020). Efficiency gains in industry, and the economic value of recycled materials and treated wastewater, result in a small net benefit for the industry and waste sectors: $1.3 billion together. Figure S.2 shows modest net costs for the electricity and buildings lines of actions. However, the benefits of cheaper electricity are accounted for under the transport, industry, and buildings sectors.

by David G. Groves, James Syme, Edmundo Molina-Perez, Carlos Calvo Hernandez, Luis F. Víctor-Gallardo, Guido Godinez-Zamora, Jairo Quirós-Tortós, Felipe De León, Andrea Meza Murillo, Valentina Saavedra Gómez, Adrien Vogt-Schilb
 

Friday, January 8, 2021

Local Sectoral Specialization in a Warming World

Abstract:
This paper quantitatively assesses the world's changing economic geography and sectoral specialization due to global warming. It proposes a two-sector dynamic spatial growth model that incorporates the relation between economic activity, carbon emissions, and temperature. The model is taken to the data at the 1° by 1° resolution for the entire world. Over a 200-year horizon, rising temperatures consistent with emissions under Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 push people and economic activity northwards to Siberia, Canada, and Scandinavia. Compared to a world without climate change, clusters of agricultural specialization shift from Central Africa, Brazil, and India's Ganges Valley, to Central Asia, parts of China and northern Canada. Equatorial latitudes that lose agriculture specialize more in non-agriculture but, due to their persistently low productivity, lose population. By the year 2200, predicted losses in real GDP and utility are 6% and 15%, respectively. Higher trade costs make adaptation through changes in sectoral specialization more costly, leading to less geographic concentration in agriculture and larger climate-induced migration.
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Thursday, January 7, 2021

These Trees Are Not What They Seem - How the Nature Conservancy, the world’s biggest environmental group, became a dealer of meaningless carbon offsets

At first glance, big corporations appear to be protecting great swaths of U.S. forests in the fight against climate change.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. has paid almost $1 million to preserve forestland in eastern Pennsylvania. Forty miles away, Walt Disney Co. has spent hundreds of thousands to keep the city of Bethlehem, Pa., from aggressively harvesting a forest that surrounds its reservoirs.  Across the state line in New York, investment giant BlackRock Inc. has paid thousands to the city of Albany to refrain from cutting trees around its reservoirs.

... By funding the preservation of carbon-absorbing forests, the companies say, they’re offsetting the carbon-producing impact of their global operations. But in all of those cases, the land was never threatened; the trees were already part of well-preserved forests.... By taking credit for saving well-protected land, these companies are reducing nowhere near the pollution that they claim.

The Nature Conservancy recruits landowners and enrolls its own well-protected properties in carbon-offset projects, which generate credits that give big companies an inexpensive way to claim large emissions reductions. In these transactions, each metric ton of reduced emissions is represented by a financial instrument known as a carbon offset. The corporations buy the offsets, with the money flowing to the landowners and the Conservancy. The corporate buyers then use those credits to subtract an equivalent amount of emissions from their own ledgers.
https://www.hawkmountain.org/visit/hiking/accessibility/silhouette-trail
The market for these credits is booming, according to BloombergNEF.... In the first 10 months of this year, companies used more than 55.1 million carbon credits to offset their emissions (equivalent to the pollution from 12 million cars), a 28% increase from the same period in 2019. While some of these credits are paying for projects that are truly reducing emissions, an unknown number represent inflated claims.

Few have jumped into this growing market with as much zeal as the Nature Conservancy,... protecting more than 125 million acres. Last year its revenue was $932 million, which eclipsed the combined budgets of the country’s next three largest environmental nonprofits.

Danny Cullenward, a lecturer at Stanford and policy director at CarbonPlan, a nonprofit that analyzes climate solutions says.if the Conservancy is enrolling landowners who had no intention of cutting their trees ... “they’re engaged in the business of creating fake carbon offsets.”

The Conservancy defends its carbon-offset projects, saying that all adhere to peer-reviewed methodologies developed by independent registries and that each project is validated by third-party auditors.
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A forested ridge, 80 miles northwest of Philadelphia, ... claimed as a protectorate of JPMorgan and other corporate patrons, ... generates carbon credits.... These 2,380 acres of trees have absorbed almost a half-million tons of carbon dioxide, storing it in their trunks, stems, and roots. If not for payments for carbon offsets ... This would be jeopardized, according to documents for the project, developed by the Nature Conservancy and Blue Source LLC, a carbon-project development company. Aggressive timber harvesting could “feasibly occur,” the documents say, wiping out about 89% of the living trees in only five years.... The landowner generates hundreds of thousands of carbon offsets—worth millions of dollars—over a two-decade period. JPMorgan has ... acquired more than 96,000 of the offsets, which  ... help erase the emissions from its employees’ air travel.  But this ... ridge wasn’t in peril. Ninety years ago hunters congregated on these mountains each fall to shoot the hawks for sport.  Rosalie Edge, a philanthropist ... acquired the land, hired a warden, and kicked out the hunters in the 1930s. Edge created a nonprofit ... to preserve the forested land as natural habitat for the migrating birds.  The trees have remained untouched for 85 years. Hawk Mountain has become wildly popular with researchers and birdwatchers, with 60,000 visitors each year. The nonprofit has grown into a $3 million organization.... The additional revenue from the carbon-offset program helps them take better care of the land, plant more saplings, and improve the forest’s health.... The project documents show almost all of the credits come from the assumption that the land would have been heavily harvested. However, the nonprofit had no intention to cut down most of its trees.
ACR, like other carbon registries, says it’s impossible to predict how lands will be managed in the future and prefers to compare the forested properties to nearby parcels, including those run by commercial timber harvesters.

... Carbon can gets reduced by spending $200 a ton capturing CO2 from the exhaust of a coal-burning power plant in China or one-tenth that amount planting trees to absorb the gas in Chile.   By allowing companies or governments to pay—and take credit for—cheaper emissions reductions beyond their fence lines, the cost of addressing climate change becomes less formidable. It also allows industries with little flexibility, such as airlines, where cleaner biofuels aren’t yet widely available to power fleets, to start taking action to reduce their net emissions.
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Delta Air Lines Inc., for instance, earlier this year vowed to allocate $1 billion over the next decade, much of it on carbon offsets, to zero out the greenhouse gas emissions from its hundreds of aircraft. Royal Dutch Shell Plc says it’s spending $300 million over three years on projects that will eventually generate offsets by increasing the amount of carbon trees and soil absorb. And Microsoft Corp. and Google recently vowed to erase all of the historic carbon emissions from their operations, which will require them to buy millions of offsets (most cost about $8 to $10 per credit).

Some experts say this is just the beginning. Offsets will need to grow by at least fifteenfold if the world is to have any chance of zeroing out all its carbon emissions by 2050, says Mark Carney, special envoy on climate action and finance to the United Nations, who started a task force in September to help boost the credibility and supply of offsets.

Academics have worried for years about the validity of many forest offset projects, because it’s difficult to predict what would have happened without carbon revenue. But some nonforest projects clearly show how offsets can be effective. For instance, Stripe, a San Francisco-based technology company, recently paid $775 per ton to Climeworks AG, a Swiss company that uses renewable geothermal energy to capture CO2 from the air, concentrate it, and store it underground in rock formations. In this case, the carbon payment from Stripe is causing the reduction to happen, because there is no other reason for Climeworks to carry out this expensive process. (It hopes to drive that cost down to $100 to $200 per ton.)

Climate Finance

Abstract:
We review the literature studying interactions between climate change and financial markets. We first discuss various approaches to incorporating climate risk in macro-finance models. We then review the empirical literature that explores the pricing of climate risks across a large number of asset classes including real estate, equities, and fixed income securities. In this context, we also discuss how investors can use these assets to construct portfolios that hedge against climate risk. We conclude by proposing several promising directions for future research in climate finance.
...
Our review of the current literature is organized into two parts. In the first section, we discuss efforts to incorporate climate risk into macro-finance models. The pioneering work of Nordhaus (1977) paved the way for thinking about the interaction of the physical process of climate change with the real economy. Early papers in this literature — such as Nordhaus (1977, 1991, 1992) — focused on optimal climate change mitigation, and worked in deterministic settings. As such, these papers did not directly speak to the ways in which climate change affects asset prices and risk premia. Subsequent work extends these models to incorporate different aspects of risk and uncertainty about climate change and its link to the economy. These attributes include the stochastic nature of physical and economic processes as well as uncertainty about models of these processes (see, for example, the work by Kolstad, 1992, Manne et al., 1992, Nordhaus, 1994, Kelly & Kolstad, 1999, Nordhaus & Popp, 1997, Weitzman, 2001, 2009, Lemoine & Traeger, 2012, Golosov et al., 2014). Much of this literature has focused on the way risks and uncertainties affect optimal mitigation policies and the “social cost of carbon.” More recently, the financial economics literature has explored the implications of these models for the prices and returns of financial assets.

In the second part of this review article, we discuss the empirical literature that explores the pricing of climate risk across a large number of asset classes. This literature considers the price effects of at least two broad categories of climate related risk factors: physical climate risk and transition risk. Physical climate risk includes risks of the direct impairment of productive assets resulting from climate change; transition risk includes risks to cash flows arising from a possible transition to a lowcarbon economy. A central element of the research designs in these papers is that assets are differentially exposed to these climate risk factors: for example, houses located near the sea are more exposed to physical climate risks, while coal companies are more exposed to transition risks. Many papers then combine the differential exposure of assets within an asset class with time-varying attention paid to climate risk in order to understand how this type of risk is priced in asset markets. We review research that documents climate-related asset price effects in equity markets, bond markets, housing markets, and mortgage markets. We also discuss recent work that shows how one can use financial assets to construct portfolios that hedge climate change risks.
...
To sum up, the debate around the term structure of discount rates for valuing investments to mitigate climate change (and its effects on the social cost of carbon) can in large part be traced to different assumptions about the nature of the shocks that mitigation investments are hedging, and about the dynamics of the economy and the climate in response to those shocks. While this two-dimensional distinction does not fully span the variety of models that have been written in the literature, it helps to understand what has lead the literature to reach different (sometimes opposite) conclusions.
https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2019/
...
Lemoine (2020) argues that accounting for model uncertainty leads to higher estimates of the social cost of carbon than would otherwise prevail. ... Uncertainty thus introduces a new channel that impacts asset prices in the form of covariance between model parameters and agents’ consumption. This induces precautionary savings and risk premia effects in addition to those resulting from stochastic shocks in standard unambiguous models. Viewing damage uncertainty as a compound lottery, when the
agent “draws” an especially adverse damage parameter, carbon mitigation becomes especially valuable and raises the social cost of carbon (as long as relative risk aversion is greater than one, as commonly assumed in calibrations of macro and finance models).
...
Barnett et al. (2020) analyze the additional incremental effects of ambiguity aversion on the social cost of carbon. Holding fixed the extent of model uncertainty, they compare model calibrations with ambiguity averse investors versus a model with ambiguity neutrality.  Ambiguity aversion magnifies the cost of carbon by roughly 60% to 70% in current value terms relative to the baseline scenario with model uncertainty but ambiguity neutrality.
...
Krueger et al. (2020) conduct a survey of active investment managers to explore their approaches to managing climate risk. They find that investors believe that climate change has significant financial implications for portfolio firms, and that considerations of climate risk are important in the investment process. For example, 39% of investors in the survey reported to be working to reduce the carbon footprints in their portfolios. These survey responses are also consistent with findings from Alok et al. (2020), who show that fund managers adjust their portfolios in response to climatic disasters. Pedersen et al. (forthcoming) provide an ESG CAPM framework and outline how investor beliefs and preferences regarding climate change risks (and ESG considerations more broadly) fit in with the factor model paradigm that dominates empirical asset pricing research.
...
Given the attention that investors dedicate to climate change, a growing literature explores the pricing of various dimensions of climate risk in equity markets (e.g., Hong et al., 2019). Much of this literature has focused on the effects of regulatory climate risk, where different measures of carbon intensity or environmental friendliness are often used as proxies for regulatory climate risk. For example, Bolton & Kacperczyk (2020) analyze U.S. equity markets, and demonstrate that firms with higher carbon emissions are valued at a discount. Quantitatively, the authors estimate that a one standard deviation increase in emissions across firms is associated with a rise in expected returns of roughly 2% per annum. The authors trace this effect at least in part to exclusionary screening performed by institutional investors to limit the carbon risk in their portfolios. In related work, Hsu et al. (2020) show a similar spread in average returns between high- and low-pollution firms, and link it to uncertainty about environmental policy. Engle et al. (2020) document that stocks of firms with high E-Scores — which the authors argue capture lower exposure to regulatory climate risk — have higher returns during periods with negative news about the future path of climate change. Similarly, Choi et al. (2020) explore global stock market data and find that stocks of carbon-intensive firms underperform during times with abnormally warm weather, a period when investors’ attention to climate risks are likely to be particularly high. Barnett (2020) uses an event study analysis to explore financial market impacts of regulatory risk. He finds that increases in the likelihood of future climate policy action lead to decreased equity prices for firms with high exposure to climate policy risk. Similar evidence of the pricing of climate risk can be found in equity options markets. Ilhan et al. (2019) show that the cost of option protection against extreme downside risks is larger for firms with more carbon-intense business models, and particularly so at times when there is an increased public attention to climate risk.

















..
Climate risks may also affect financial assets beyond equities. Municipal bond markets are a particularly interesting setting for analyzing the financial market implications of climate risk. In particular, when considering the physical risks of climate change, firms may be at risk depending on the location of their production facilities. However, even the most exposed firms usually have the option of relocating their modes of production to other geographies. Municipalities have no such luxury. As a result, one would expect that municipal debt backed by tax revenues from localities more exposed to physical climate risks such as rising sea levels or wildfires would trade at a substantial discount. In evidence along these lines, Painter (2020) shows that at-issuance municipal bond yields are higher for counties with large expected losses due to sea level rise (SLR). Consistent with the hypothesis that such price differences reflect the pricing of climate risk, he finds that this effect is concentrated in long-dated bonds and essentially absent at short maturities over which the likelihood of SLR remains low. In related work, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2019) show via a structural model that this effect of SLR on municipal bond yields is tantamount to a 3–8% reduction in the present value of local government long-run cash flows.
...
To implement this dynamic hedging strategy, it is necessary to determine which firms increase or decrease in value when there is news around climate change.  Engle et al. (2020) solve this problem by proxying for firms’ climate risk exposures using “E-Scores” that capture various aspects of how environmentally friendly a firm is. The hedge portfolio would then overweight high-E-Score firms, and underweight lowE-Score firms, with the relative weights updated dynamically as more data on the relationship between E-Scores, climate news, and asset prices is obtained. While it is straightforward to construct such a hedge with the benefit of hindsight, the true test of a hedge portfolio is its ability to profit in adverse conditions on an out-of-sample basis. Indeed, Engle et al. (2020) find an out-of-sample correlation of 20% to 30% between the return of the hedge portfolio and innovations in the WSJ climate change news index. In summary, the paper provides a rigorous methodology for constructing portfolios to hedge against climate risks that are otherwise difficult to insure.
...
Zillow economist Krishna Rao (2017) calculates that a six feet sea level rise would put 1.9 million homes worth about $882 billion at risk of flooding, with about half the losses coming from Florida alone. 
...
Using these data, Giglio et al. (2020) show that while properties in a flood zone generally trade at a premium compared to otherwise similar properties (likely because of positive amenities such as beach access), this premium compresses in periods with elevated attention paid to climate risk. Quantitatively, a doubling in the Climate Attention Index (i.e., a doubling in the share of listings that mention climate risk-related words) is associated with a relative 2.4% decline in the transaction prices of properties in the flood zone.
...
A number of other papers exploit related research designs to explore the pricing of climate risk in real estate markets. Bernstein et al. (2019) also explore the relationship between house prices and sea level rise (SLR). They find that houses that are exposed to sea level rise sell for a discount compared with observably equivalent unexposed properties. The authors are able to control for the distance from the beach, which allows them to alleviate some concerns around differential amenity values of these properties. Quantitatively, properties that will be inundated after one foot of global average SLR sell at a 14.7% discount, properties inundated with two to three feet of SLR sell at a 13.8% discount, and properties inundated with six feet of SLR sell at a discount of 4.4%. Baldauf et al. (2020) present related evidence suggesting that the extent to which physical climate risk is priced in housing markets depends on whether the local population believes in climate change. Bakkensen & Barrage (2017) explore a similar point, highlighting that when individuals who do not believe in climate change disproportionately sort to purchase more exposed properties, this will reduce the extent to which climate change risk is priced in housing markets.

Tuesday, January 5, 2021

Carbon Pricing and Innovation in a World of Political Constraints

Executive Summary:
Workshop Purpose
- In March 2020, a workshop of academic and policy experts was convened including economists, political scientists, energy innovation scholars and policy practitioners, seeking to synthesize collective expertise and academic research and to reflect on the role of carbon pricing and innovation in climate policy.
- Participants discussed the experience with carbon pricing around the world and the way forward for carbon pricing as a climate policy tool, including political feasibility, economic efficiency, and interaction and integration with other policy mechanisms. The workshop emphasized in particular the importance of political economy considerations on the design, implementation, and durability of climate policies.

Main Points of Discussion
- Carbon pricing has been an important pillar of climate policy discussions, facing no shortage of support from economists and policymakers favoring cost-effective reductions in carbon pollution. To date, around 15% of global carbon emissions are subject to carbon prices, most well under $50/tCO₂.
- Real-world experience with carbon pricing policies is mixed. In Sweden and British Columbia, carbon taxes have led to some emissions reductions, while many other places have low and ineffectual prices. Jurisdictions like Australia and Ontario, Canada have also rolled back policies. Broad-scale experience in California, the Northeast and mid-Atlantic (RGGI) states, and the EU has shown that carbon pricing systems should be seen in the context of wider climate policies and can be a source of revenues for other policy objectives.
- Key criteria for climate policy design are environmental efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and political feasibility as well as durability over time and the interaction of carbon pricing with broader climate, environmental, economic and social policies and political priorities.
- Political challenges in the form of wavering public support and interest group pressures can handicap carbon price policies as prices rise and benefits are perceived as diffuse. Research indicates this is particularly true in nations with higher income inequality.
- Carbon prices supported by complementary innovation and industrial policies can bring down technology and compliance costs and can potentially be sequenced to build political coalitions for more expansive climate policy over time.

Key Recommendations
- Well implemented carbon pricing policies are a potentially important tool in the climate policy toolkit. However, carbon pricing cannot stand alone. Politically feasible carbon pricing policies are not sufficient to drive emissions reductions or innovation at the scale and pace necessary.
- Carbon pricing should be implemented as part of a comprehensive suite of climate policies, such as clean energy standards, low or no-carbon transportation projects, government procurement and subsidy for market adoption of emerging technologies, and direct support for clean energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D).
- Using revenues from carbon pricing for clean energy RDD&D, public infrastructure projects, public procurement or subsidy, and alleviating distributional burdens associated with climate policy, may further decarbonization goals and increase public support.
...
Mechanisms
Carbon pricing can be most directly implemented through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system. Tax instruments provide greater price certainty; quantity instruments, like cap-and-trade, provide greater emissions certainty. Under a carbon tax, the carbon price remains stable, while emissions can vary depending upon the degree to which emitters choose to pay the tax versus reducing emissions. Carbon prices are often designed to increase over time—a feature that may increase their efficacy while undermining their popularity. With cap-and-trade programs, the emissions level is set by the cap, while the price can vary depending upon the supply and demand for allowances. In practice, quantity and price instruments can be hybridized to achieve some of the benefits of both approaches. California’s cap-and-trade system, for example, includes price floors and ceilings to limit price uncertainties.

Other cap-and-trade design considerations concern carbon “leakage”—the potential for carbon pricing in one jurisdiction or sector to lead to increases in emissions in other jurisdictions or sectors—and other trade implications, emissions hotspots, linkage to other systems, and whether or not to allow carbon offsets. All these decisions need to weigh a number of competing environmental, economic, and political priorities.

The Social Cost of Carbon
One metric often combined—and all-too-often confused—with conversations around carbon pricing is the social cost of carbon (SCC). The SCC, technically the “SC-CO2,” is typically defined as the marginal social damage, or cost, of one additional ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) being emitted into the atmosphere. It plays an important role in shaping policy decisions across the world, providing a metric to measure the economic harm of climate impacts, and to thereby calculate the benefit of regulatory or policy action. To calculate the SCC, researchers estimate the current and future CO2 or broader GHG emissions impacts on the economy, earth systems, and human welfare. Computing the SCC combines modeling of complex economic, behavioral, and geophysical systems.

Social cost of carbon calculations have a long and storied history. Yale economist Bill Nordhaus was one early pioneer. He shared the Nobel Prize in economics for his efforts leading to the calculation of the SCC. His calibrations have been famously conservative, leading to an SCC of around $40/ton of CO2 (tCO2) emitted today, a number similar to that calculated by the Obama Administration’s Interagency Working Group for the Social Cost of Carbon. Recent work applying the same fundamental benefit-cost model has led to SCC estimates of at least $100/tCO2, sometimes $200/tCO2 and above, typically driven by updated climate damage and discount rate assumptions. Most unknowns and unknowables result in still higher SCC estimates. The same goes for other extensions such as more disaggregated climate damage functions, and heterogeneity within and across countries, which result in estimates of around $400/tCO2.

Monday, January 4, 2021

Trudeau Hikes Carbon Tax to $170 a ton by 2030 to Reach 30% GHG Reduction Climate Goal

On December 11, 2020 Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, announced Canada's strengthened climate plan, A Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy. The proposed plan is supported by an initial $15 billion in investments.

The plan's measures:
  • Make places more affordable by cutting energy waste and create thousands of good new jobs, including through investments in retrofits.
  • Make clean, affordable transportation and power available in every community, by expanding the supply of clean electricity through investments and other measures to increase renewables and next-generation clean energy and technology.
  • Continue to ensure pollution isn't free and households get more money back by giving more money back to households in a way that leaves the majority of them better off, and reduces pollution, by continuing to put a rising price on pollution through to 2030.
  • Build Canada's clean industrial advantage by helping Canadian businesses reduce emissions and make low-carbon products that the world wants to buy now and into the future.
  • Embrace the power of nature to support healthier families and more resilient communities making communities more resilient to extreme weather by planting two billion trees, supporting sustainable farming, and better managing, conserving, and restoring our nature.

"Prime Minister announces Canada's strengthened climate plan to protect the environment, create jobs, and support communities"
Press Release dated December 11, 2020
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In "Ottawa to hike federal carbon tax to $170 a tonne by 2030" John Paul Tasker of the Canadian Broadcasting Company reported that  its centrepiece is a gradual hike in the federal carbon tax on fuels to $170 a tonne by that year. The carbon tax will increase significantly from its current level — the tax is just $30 a tonne this year — as part of a push to meet and surpass Canada's ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. In real terms, that would mean lowering GHG emissions from 732 megatonnes to 513 megatonnes by 2030. With the plan announced Friday, the government now forecasts national emissions will hit 503 megatonnes by 2030.

"Simply put, it would be much harder to cut pollution if it was free to pollute. The principle is straightforward: a carbon price establishes how much businesses and households need to pay for their pollution. The higher the price, the greater the incentive to pollute less, conserve energy and invest in low-carbon solutions," says the government's new climate plan, titled, "A Healthy Environment and A Healthy Economy."

The tax already was expected to hit $50 a tonne in 2022. With this new initiative, the tax will now increase by $15 a tonne each year for the next eight years in order to wean consumers off fossil fuels in favour of cleaner energy sources.

The tax hike will result in higher costs for consumers when they buy gasoline. The price at the pump will increase by 37.57 cents a litre by 2030 as a result of this new plan, and the cost of light fuel oil for home heating, natural gas and propane will rise as well.

To compensate for the cost-of-living increase, the government said it will continue to return most of the money collected by this program through rebates.

Under the current system, the money is returned to individuals and families annually through the 'Climate Action incentive payment' when they file tax returns. Starting in 2022, the carbon pollution rebate payments will be distributed on a quarterly basis.

The average family of four in Ontario will collect roughly $2,018 a year in climate rebates by 2030.

The cheques will be higher in provinces like Alberta and Saskatchewan — $3,242 for a family of four in Alberta and $3,829 for a similar family in Saskatchewan — because the people in those provinces generate more carbon emissions per capita.

Sunday, December 6, 2020

All Aircraft Could Fly on Sustainable Fuel by 2030, Says World Economic Forum Report

  • Enough sustainable feedstock supplies, such as municipal waste, agricultural residues and cooking oil waste, exist to reach production levels of 500 million tons of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) annually, meeting the projected jet fuel demand of all aviation by 2030.
  • Planned production capacity investments will, however, only yield 4 million tons annually by 2030 – approximately 1% of global jet fuel demand for 2030 – requiring the urgent stimulation of a viable SAF ecosystem to reach 2030 decarbonization targets.
  • Hybrid-electric and hydrogen-powered aircraft could help the industry reach the next efficiency target, but development and deployment at scale could take 10 to 20 years.
  • The Cleans Skies for Tomorrow (CST) initiative is working on a pilot project for the creation of a SAF sector in India and plans to replicate this process in other markets.
The Sustainable Aviation Fuels as a Pathway to Net-Zero Aviation Report shows that a transition to carbon-neutral flying is possible, with SAF the most promising decarbonization option in the near term.

There are enough sustainable, renewable feedstocks to fuel all aviation using SAF by 2030. Scaling up SAF production to meet the net-zero ambition, however, depends on several new technology routes and significant multistakeholder collaboration. The main challenge will be developing appropriate commercial, financing, incentives and regulatory mechanisms.

SAF as a feasible route to net-zero aviation

In 2019, aviation accounted for 3% of human-made carbon emissions. Hybrid-electric and hydrogen-powered aircraft could help the industry reach the next efficiency target, but development and deployment at scale could take 10 to 20 years and the technology will initially be limited to smaller, shorter-range aircraft.

Furthermore, in 2019, fewer than 200,000 metric tons of SAF were produced globally, a tiny fraction of the roughly 300 million tons of jet fuel used by commercial airlines.

More positively, SAF has already fuelled more than one-quarter of a million commercial flights and is compatible with existing aircraft and fuelling infrastructure.

Even following the challenge to aviation during the COVID-19 pandemic, members of the CST coalition are continuing their commitment to drive energy transition in aviation towards the goal of net-zero aviation.

An economic opportunity for developing markets

Aviation delivers significant benefits globally, not least to developing markets, from where a sizeable portion of global aviation demand is expected to come. The current crisis may also present an opportunity for countries with low renewable power prices and ready access to feedstock. If these countries act now, they can benefit from energy transition in aviation and become global SAF production hubs.

“The structural changes happening in the industry are an opportunity to rebuild and transition towards a low-carbon future and meet the sustainability demands of its consumers,” said Christoph Wolff, Head of Mobility Industries at the World Economic Forum.

To this end, the CST initiative is working on a pilot project to create a SAF sector in India and plans to replicate this process in other markets that have the necessary conditions to foster a valuable SAF industry.

Building scale is key to improving cost

This report, written in collaboration with McKinsey & Company, shows that despite feedstock availability and even if all currently announced SAF projects are completed, capacity will only increase to approximately 4 million tons annually, which equates to approximately 1% of global jet fuel demand in 2030.

Currently, SAF is more than double the cost of conventional fuel. As further innovations and efficiencies of scale in production are achieved, prices will drop.

“We see the classic Catch-22 problem as in other energy transition discussions. Insufficient scale drives per unit costs high and high costs keep demand low. Some structural solutions could break this impasse – B2B contracts, prioritized aviation and airport fee structures etc. that will give fuel producers the required support to invest in production capacity,” said Daniel Riefer, Associate Partner, McKinsey & Company.

Investments can accelerate promising new technologies

Fuels produced from used cooking oil and other lipids will contribute most to developing capacity in the short term. New technologies take time to mature and develop, but investment decisions, including building larger demonstration plants, are needed now.

Power-to-liquid fuels can contribute the most to SAF capacity, but will only prove effective after 2030 under current development plans. Fuels made from CO2 and green electricity will require financial support for their technology to mature and will need access to renewable electricity.

There is no silver bullet for net-zero aviation. No single feedstock will be practical in every geography or yield enough SAF to meet all demand. Even as costs fall, SAF will have higher production costs than fossil fuels, though a rising carbon price may enable parity in the 2030s.

While the report demonstrates that enough feedstocks are available globally to make SAF economically viable and scalable, several factors are required. These include supportive regulatory frameworks, measures to stimulate demand from corporate and private customers, and innovative ways to finance the transition. The CST coalition is debating how to meet these challenges and help aviation earn its right to keep growing.

...
Carbon offsets ... may be beneficial and airlines are on board with market-based measures such as CORSIA, which may advance global reforestation. Reforestation offsetting schemes can cost as little as $5 per metric ton of CO2  captured, but increasing demand could lead to significant cost increases over time and there remain significant risks and questions over their long-term effectiveness. Other offsetting projects include resource recovery, such as capturing methane from landfills. Geological sequestration may be the most effective option currently available, but it is expensive and is still a nascent technology. 
...
HEFA (Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acid synthetic paraffinic kerosenes - SAFs) will likely remain the most efficient pathway through 2030. It is the most cost competitive since the proven technology requires relatively little capital investment – the main barrier is the cost of feedstock, a commodity with no big cost-reduction potential. Production costs depend mostly on the cost of feedstock, which today ranges from about $600 to $950 per metric ton. Including the cost of used cooking oil, solar-based hydrogen and operating and capital expenses, which should all decline in the years ahead, total production costs per metric ton of SAF could decrease from around $1,400 today to around $1,100 by 2050 in constant dollars, compared to a steady cost of fossil jet fuel of about $620. Due to falling production costs and availability of sustainable feedstock, by 2030, HEFA produced anywhere in the world could cover 100% of European jet fuel demand at less than 1,500 USD/t.